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Abstract: This paper provides the first micro-level evidence for the existence and pat-
terns of intra-national protectionism in China. We demonstrate that drug advertising
inspections are used by provincial governments to discriminate against firms from out-
side the province. We further reveal systematic patterns in the degree of discrimination
across firms: those from neighboring areas, those from regions with more economic links
to the destination province, those from provinces with stronger presence in the mar-
ket, and those with political ties to “allied” provincial governments are less likely to be
targeted. Our findings highlight the unique politico-economic structure in China and
confirm that giving local governments strong incentives to compete with each other may
exacerbate the market distortions inherent in a partially reformed economy.
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“Although the central government has released control over prices, outputs, and
enterprise budgets, these functions have been taken up, albeit in a less systematic
fashion, by local governments. Thus, China has moved from having one central
plan to having many, mutually competitive, central plans.” Young (2000, p. 1129)
“[A]ccording to Espicom, discrimination [by provincial governments] in favor of
locally produced drugs is an accepted practice [in China].” Deloitte (2011, p. 23)
1 Introduction
The analysis of barriers to trade within countries has received growing attention in the
recent literature (e.g. Atkin and Donaldson, 2015; Cos¸ar and Fajgelbaum, forthcoming;
Coughlin and Novy, 2013; Ramondo et al., 2014). Barriers to domestic economic activity
are to a large extent created by intra-national protectionism, preventing the efficient allo-
cation of resources and attenuating the benefits of scale economies and spatial spillovers
within the economy, as well as offsetting potential gains from a more liberal international
trade environment. This argument is particularly relevant for China as it made a strong
commitment to further open up domestic markets upon joining the WTO in 2001. Nev-
ertheless, existing research suggests limited improvement in domestic market integration
or even increased fragmentation in China (Poncet, 2003, 2005; World Bank, 2006), which
casts doubt on how well the Chinese market is and can be integrated into the global
economy compared to what its government promised.
Our paper informs this debate by providing empirical evidence on how regulations
combined with regional competition among provinces can be a possible cause for domes-
tic market fragmentation in China. Specifically, we present a setting where it is shown
that the imposition of regulation at the local level can be used for protectionist pur-
poses against outside competition and for the creation of intra-national barriers. To the
best of our knowledge, this study provides the first micro-level evidence for the presence
and patterns of provincial protectionism in China, going beyond the existing analysis
at the province or industry level (Young, 2000; Bai et al., 2004; Poncet, 2005; Amiti
and Javorcik, 2008; Holz, 2009; Herrmann-Pillatha et al., 2014). We do so through the
investigation of a unique case — the public disclosure of “illegal” drug advertisements
by provincial Food and Drug Administrations (FDAs) as a penalty for the violation of
advertising regulations. We show that the enforcement of ambiguous advertisement rules
through selective disclosure is employed to engage in local protectionism, motivated by an
institutional setup which aligns the interests of provincial governments and local FDAs.
1
A second set of results provides evidence for heterogeneity in the disclosure targets:
nonlocal firms from adjacent areas, those from regions with more economic ties to the
destination province or with a stronger presence in the drug market, and those with
political ties to “allied” provincial governments are less likely to be disclosed. These
findings are rationalized by the facts that regional competition in China is shaped by
inter-provincial relationships and that local governments may strategically target weaker
rivals to avoid future retaliation from strong opponents (“tit-for-tat”). Our results imply
that giving provincial governments strong incentives to compete with each other may
lead to rent-seeking behavior, echoing the conclusion in Young (2000, p. 1091) that in a
partially reformed economy “distortions beget distortions”.
This paper is closely linked to the literature on inter-provincial barriers to trade in
China. Using primarily regional output and price data, Young (2000) presents various
evidence that trade barriers between Chinese provinces increased during the reform period
starting from the late 1970s. This finding has however been challenged by Holz (2009)
who uses the same data to show that Young’s results are not robust and the internal trade
barriers are at most on a par with those in a developed economy like the US. Despite
this disagreement, both authors seem to support the notion that trade barriers in China
are to a large extent created by local “fiefdoms”. How these “fiefdoms” actually erect
trade barriers is however not investigated, and in the present study we endeavor to provide
evidence in this regard. We collect detailed information on those drug manufacturers that
have fallen foul of ambiguous advertising rules, which we show can be exploited by local
governments to protect local firms from nonlocal competitors. This study thus provides
the first direct firm-level evidence for local protectionism and market fragmentation in
China, and further characterizes the patterns of discrimination.
Our study also adds to the current debate on “regulatory protectionism” that appears
to have emerged as a new “hidden threat” to free trade (e.g. Baldwin, 2000; Chen and
Novy, 2011; Bao and Qiu, 2012). In an era where conventional trade barriers have
been reduced significantly, protectionism in the guise of technical regulations represents
a persistent force against globalization, continuing to shelter domestic producers against
foreign competition. In this paper we reveal politico-economic forces as an important
cause for such protectionism in the internal market of a developing country.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the institutional
background, Section 3 describes the main data, Section 4 contains the empirical results
and offers explanations on the patterns found, and Section 5 concludes.
2
2 Institutional Background
Drugs account for around half of total health spending in China (Sun et al., 2008), three
times the share in OECD countries and twice that in other middle-income countries
(Meng et al., 2005). It is however widely observed that this large domestic market is
severely fragmented by various forms of local protectionism. For example, according to a
nationwide survey conducted by a national newspaper Yiyao Jingji Bao (Medicine Eco-
nomic News) in 2010, over 90% of corporate respondents reported having been adversely
affected by local protectionism in drug procurement where institutional buyers strongly
favored local producers. Such experiences are however not unique to institutional pro-
curement, but also prevalent in the retail market. The notorious difficulty of opening
cross-regional pharmacy franchises is reported to be mainly caused by local authorities’
deliberate over-bureaucratization when dealing with applications from nonlocal retailers
(Xinhua News, 2001). Directly relevant to this study, reports of local governments’ re-
luctance to inspect and disclose local producers are also frequently seen in the media
(e.g. People’s Daily Online, 2013). These phenomena were so epidemic that in 2000 the
State FDA issued a prohibition notice to all local FDAs explicitly forbidding any form of
protectionist behavior against nonlocal drug sellers, with warnings of severe punishment
for local FDA officials upon violation (State FDA, 2000).
The difficulty of promoting sales in a nonlocal market, together with the fierce com-
petition from a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises producing generic
over-the-counter drugs (Clark, 2007; Sun et al., 2008), represent major motivations for
firms to engage in advertising (Xinhua News, 2004), making the pharmaceuticals industry
“one of the highest spenders on advertising in China” (Deloitte, 2011, p. 22). On a prac-
tical level, drug producers in China are required to obtain licenses from the respective
provinces in order to advertise in any official media outlet in these regions — including
television, radio, newspapers, and billboards on commercial vehicles (Deloitte, 2011).
We argue that the institutional setup and the role of FDAs within China’s political sys-
tem provide both scope and incentives for provincial protectionism. For the period under
study, the budget and personnel of provincial FDAs were under the control of provincial
governments in that the latter not only determined and approved the provincial FDA’s
costing but also appointed its most senior officials. In addition, provincial governments
also exerted indirect control over lower-level FDAs who were subordinate branches of
provincial FDAs in a vertically hierarchical structure; see Fig. 1. Consequently, the daily
activities of FDAs at all administrative levels within a province, including the monitoring
of pharmaceutical firms and their advertising practices, were significantly constrained by
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the provincial government in a direct or indirect way.1 By taking hold of the pivotal phys-
ical and human resources of local FDAs, the provincial government had great influence
over their daily business, enabling it to impose its preferences on their activities.
[Fig. 1 about here]
The influence of local government is rooted in the unique fiscal and political system
in China. Introduced in 1994, a new decentralized fiscal system specifies the division of
tax revenues between central and local governments, intended to provide tax incentives
to provincial governments to push economic development (Qian and Roland, 1998; Cai
and Treisman, 2004; Jin et al., 2005). Of all types of tax, value-added tax (VAT) is
the major source of fiscal revenue for the government with 75% of it going to Beijing
and 25% staying at the local level.2 Importantly, firms pay VAT to the tax authority of
the province where they are located (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China, 1998), contributing directly to local government budget. A further motivation for
protecting local economic interests is from the political side: promotions of local gover-
nors within the Communist Party are highly dependent on local economic performance,
including gross products and tax revenue (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005; Jia,
2014).3 More formally, a recent theory asserts that China’s superior economic growth
has been partly driven by the fact that empowered local governors endogenously create
regional barriers to benefit their “crony” local entrepreneurs for economic and political
rewards (Bai et al., 2014). These forces incentivize local governments to adopt policies
which impose, explicitly or implicitly, additional costs on firms from other provinces.
In the case of the drug industry, as the government departments in charge of the
implementation of the advertisement regulation, provincial FDAs regularly carry out
investigations to spot “illegal” advertisements, send the advertisers a notice of violation,
suspend or in case of serious violation cancel their advertising licenses outright, and report
the “illegal” cases to other government authorities (e.g. the Bureau for Industry and
Commerce) for further administrative and legal actions (fines; suspension or prohibition
of sales). Cases of violation are reported by provincial FDAs to the State FDA, then
1This system was in place between 2000 and 2008, after which it shifted back to a previous setup
where lower-level governments, instead of provincial FDAs, had direct control over lower-level FDAs via
budget and personnel decisions. However, since this study focuses on provincial-level protectionism, this
regime change would not affect the main analysis or implications even if the change happened during
the sample period.
2Figures taken from Ministry of Finance briefing on “How does VAT work in China?” available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/LivinginChina/202770.htm
3On a number of occasions in 2013 China’s President Xi Jinping publicly admitted the problems arising
from the long-standing practice of basing political appraisal and promotion of government officials on
local GDP (Xinhua News, 2013).
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publicized on the latter’s website, and finally reported in the local and national press.4
Importantly, local FDAs are entirely independent in their decision to investigate a
specific advertisement and to judge it as “illegal”. In contrast to the straightforward
case of unlicensed advertising,5 what actually constitutes an “illegal drug advertisement”
by a licensed firm as stipulated by the State FDA’s Standards of Drug Advertisement
Censorship is quite ambiguous and clearly open to interpretation. Perhaps the most
exceptional rule contained in the Standards stipulates that drug advertisements cannot
carry any indication of a positive effect brought about by application of the drug. It is then
not surprising that a report by the State FDA in 2004 revealed that strict application of
the advertising guidelines would result in 62% of all advertisements broadcast on television
and 95% of all newspaper advertisements to be classified as “illegal” (Xinhua News, 2004).
The blurred boundaries in the definition of “illegality” in practice empower local FDAs
with legitimate discretion to selectively shield or punish some producers by using a variant
and broad interpretation of the rules. State media further reports estimates that 85% to
95% of drug advertisements in Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu province, were “illegal”
by the national standards, and protection from the local government was blamed for being
one of the top reasons why the majority of these advertisements were left undealt with
(People’s Daily Online, 2005). In a recent survey conducted by a newspaper in Shandong
nearly half of the respondents regarded local protectionism as a major obstacle to dealing
with illegal advertising (Qingnian Jizhe (Youth Journalists), 2012).
3 Data
Our data for disclosed “illegal” drug advertisements (ADVERTS) for 2001-2005 are taken
from the Chinese State FDA who publicized on its website the complete lists of “illegal”
advertisings merged from provincial FDA reports.6 The State FDA website provides
details on all firms that “illegally” advertised at least five times in any media outlet.7
For each disclosed firm the information provided includes the name of the company and
4See Appendix for two examples of public disclosure.
5Further discrimination could take place in form of failure to reprimand unlicensed local advertisers.
We cannot investigate this form of protectionism in our empirical analysis as we do not have information
on which firms (licensed or not) advertised and in which provinces.
6We do not use data after 2005 as the State FDA’s criteria for disclosure changed in 2006 and only
the (subjectively) most serious violations of advertising regulations were publicized.
7We believe it is unlikely that firms acted strategically and only advertised less than five times to avoid
sanction: based on our nationwide sample of 31 provinces, only 9% of disclosed firms had advertised
exactly five times, while the overwhelming majority (91%) of disclosed firms had advertised many more
times: the mean (median) is 37 (15) advertisements and the standard deviation is 60. We do not have
data on the number of advertisements taken out by firms which were not disclosed, but as suggested
above fierce competition in a market with many firms and small margins made widespread advertising
campaigns a necessity for drug producers.
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product, the media outlet, the dates of illegal advertising, the primary reason for “ille-
gality”, and the reporting provincial FDA.8 On average, nearly 300 firms were disclosed
each year as “illegal” advertisers. We do not know the size of the penalties meted out
to disclosed firms, except that these were all sent a notice of violation and reported to
other government departments for further punishment. Nor do we have information on
the decision to inspect a firm, which prevents us from exploiting any systematic patterns
of discrimination in this choice.9
Our second source of data is the Annual Surveys of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE)
from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) which has been used in a number of
recent studies (e.g. Cai and Liu, 2009; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt et al., 2012;
Lu et al., 2013). The surveys include all state-owned firms as well as firms of other
ownership types with annual sales above 5 million yuan (around US$600,000 in year 2000
values). On average, more than 200,000 manufacturing firms were included each year,
and these accounted for around 95% of total Chinese industrial output. For the purpose
of our analysis, we restrict the sample to ASIE firms whose primary industry of operation
is reported as the pharmaceutical industry, amounting to 20,906 firm-year observations
from 7,883 firms for our period of analysis; see Fig. 2 for the geographical distribution of
pharmaceutical firms by province.
[Fig. 2 about here]
We match the annualized ADVERTS with the firm-level data from ASIE using firm
names.10 Appendix Table A1 presents details for the sample and match. About 8% of all
pharmaceutical firms in the ASIE data can be matched to the ADVERTS, constituting
the firms which were disclosed as having advertised “illegally”. Unmatched firms in ASIE
comprise (a) firms which did not advertise, and (b) firms which did advertise but were
not disclosed. Unmatched firms in ADVERTS, amounting to 143 (or 18% of the full set
of disclosed firms), represent (a) disclosed firms which were retailers, or (b) private firms
which were too small to be included in ASIE.
8Lack of detailed information about where firms advertised their products prevents us from inves-
tigating the media outlet aspect of our disclosure data. Further, this information is missing for many
disclosure cases. The limited information provided suggests that among disclosed cases in 31 provinces,
27% were found on television and in radio broadcasts, 72% in newspapers, and less than 2% in other
outlets. Focusing on newspapers, it appears that disclosures of nonlocal firms were for advertisements in
province- or lower-level outlets (prefecture or city publications), whereas local firms were only disclosed
in province-level outlets: this suggests that provincial FDAs exerted additional efforts in searching more
intensively for “illegal” advertisements by nonlocal firms.
9Similarly, while we exploit information on advertising licenses as discussed below, we do not have
data on whether licensed firms actually did advertise their products.
10We manually checked every successful match for consistency.
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Ideally our estimation strategy would exploit information on who advertised where and
when on top of information about disclosure. However, advertising is not observed in our
data unless the advertiser was disclosed. As a compromise, two samples of the integrated
data are used in our regression analysis. In the main part of the paper we use additional
sources of data about advertising licenses issued, taken from the FDA newsletters of
those provinces where such data exist. These data are only available for three provinces,
namely Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Inner Mongolia, amounting to 2,906 firm-market-year11
observations from 569 firms. The former two represent provinces with the largest number
of drug producers in the country and fare among China’s most developed regions on the
eastern seaboard. Inner Mongolia on the other hand is a peripheral province characterized
by mining and livestock breeding. The three provinces account for 24% of nationwide
pharmaceutical sales, 18% of the number of drug producers, and 16% of employment in
the country for the period of 2001-2005. In this part of analysis our results are thus
conditional on firms having been granted advertising licenses in the first place.
In auxiliary analysis we introduce additional assumptions that every firm in our full
nationwide sample advertises in the above three or in all 31 provinces. These assumptions
may sound too strong to be realistic but allow us to expand our sample to check the lower
bound of the estimates from our restricted sample and make use of the richer variation
in province characteristics. While we isolate some robust effects by countering the new
bias introduced by these unrealistic assumptions, the results from the national sample
still have to be interpreted with caution. Variables used in our analysis and their data
sources (if different from the main data) are described as they are used.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Descriptive results
We first investigate descriptive patterns across all 31 provinces. Table 1 reports the
number of matched firms by disclosure “type”. Summed over time, there are less than 40
firms which were only disclosed by their home province’s FDA, accounting for less than
4% of the total 1,059 disclosures. If we include firms which were disclosed both at home
and elsewhere this proportion rises to 12%.
[Table 1 about here]
11The term “market” here refers to one of the three provinces where firms held advertising licenses.
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Nevertheless, these patterns may have been driven by regional differences in local
FDAs’ incentives to disclose nonlocal firms. Specifically, for provinces with a more sizable
pharmaceutical sector (and thus more tax revenue), local FDAs are more likely to take
discriminatory action to protect local producers. This concern can be addressed by
taking out the effect of the size of the provincial pharmaceutical industry. Accordingly,
in Fig. 3 we use the vertical axis to represent the proportion of local producers in all
disclosed firms, and the horizontal axis to represent the relative size of the provincial
industry in the country. If we assume that every firm sell drugs in all 31 provinces,
then, in the absence of protectionism, the share of local firms being disclosed should be
in line with the relative size of the local pharmaceuticals industry (the 45◦ diagonal).
However, we find that most of the provinces lie below the 45◦ line, indicating a reduced
probability of disclosing local firms even after conditioning on the relative size of the
province’s pharmaceutical industry. A fitted regression line obtains a coefficient of 0.32,
statistically significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. See Table A2 in the Appendix
for the provincial data underlying the graph.
[Fig. 3 about here]
We now restrict our sample to the three provinces for which the data on advertising
licenses is available. Table A3 in Appendix provides details on the patterns of disclosure.12
The sample is split into disclosed and undisclosed cohorts, which are then further broken
down according to whether a firm had been granted a license or not as well as whether the
firm was local or not. Two findings emerge. First, over our sample period only a single
unlicensed local firm was disclosed (in Jiangsu). This suggests that provincial FDAs
may have turned a blind eye on unlicensed local advertisers. Second, among licensed
firms, nonlocal firms are systematically more likely to be disclosed than local firms. In
all three provinces, around 11% of nonlocal firms (243 out of 2,178) were disclosed, in
stark contrast to a mere 1% (10 out of 728) of local firms. Fig. 4 gives a time-series view
of this contrast by market as well as the three-province average. The notable divergence
in disclosure patterns of nonlocal versus local firms indicates that nonlocal advertisers
appear to be the increasingly preferred targets over time.
[Fig. 4 about here]
12Table A4 contains the descriptive statistics of the key variables.
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4.2 Regression Results
4.2.1 Existence of Local Protectionism
Given the institutional setup described above, investigations carried out by local FDAs
clearly offer room for manipulation and rent-seeking in the determination of “illegal” ad-
vertisements. It is thus reasonable to suspect that FDA drug advertising investigations
are biased toward protecting local firms. The empirically equivalent question is to investi-
gate whether the probability of a drug producer being publicly disclosed as a punishment
for “illegal” advertising is significantly higher for nonlocal producers than for their local
counterparts.
The core of our empirical evidence is made up of results from a number of linear
probability models testing the hypothesis that nonlocal drug producers are more likely
to be publicly disclosed for “illegal” advertising. The baseline results are presented in
Table 2.13 The sample is comprised of licensed firms in the three provinces since the
deliberate targeting of unlicensed firms cannot be verified in the data.14 All models
presented contain year and firm ownership effects;15 standard errors are clustered at the
firm-level. The model in column (1) shows that the probability of being disclosed is 10%
higher for nonlocal than for local firms. To further exclude confounding factors at the
firm level, in column (2) and onwards we include lagged firm sales (in logs) as a proxy for
firm size, and an indicator of whether a firm has previously been disclosed in the same
province.16 The estimated discrimination effect is now somewhat weaker — around 8%
— but remains substantial. It gets slightly more pronounced in column (3) where we
include market dummies to control for unobserved market-specific effects and in column
(4) where unobserved market-year specific effects are controlled for.17
[Table 2 about here]
The above estimates on the degree of discrimination could be affected by the influence
13Average marginal effects from probit regressions provide similar patterns (not reported).
14Our basic results remain quite robust to the exclusion of Inner Mongolia which has less drug sales
than Jiangsu and Zhejiang; see Appendix Table A5.
15Regarding ownership effects we find that foreign-invested firms (excluding investments from Hong
Kong, Macao, or Taiwan) are significantly less likely to be disclosed than other ownership types. We also
investigated the possibility of a link between nonlocal disclosure and ownership type but this did not
yield any significant empirical results, a finding in line with Bai et al. (2004) who observe that private
firms are no longer at a disadvantage compared to their state-owned counterparts.
16The estimates on these two controls are rather stable throughout the study: smaller firms are more
likely to be disclosed (with the firm size coefficient being between 1 and 2 percentage points) and prior
history explains a significant part (around 30 percentage points) of the probability of disclosure.
17Only 16 (out of 569) firms in the sample advertised both locally and nonlocally, making it impossible
to obtain precise estimates based on within-firm variation. Therefore we do not include firm-fixed effects
in any of our specifications.
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of nonlocal sellers in the local market. This is because a stronger presence of nonlocal
producers in the local market alone may increase the local government’s intention to
attack these outsiders. We can control for this possibility explicitly in our data. While
we do not know how much (in value terms) nonlocal producers sell in the local market, we
have information on the number of nonlocal versus local licensed producers. We suggest
that, other things equal, the higher the ratio of the former to the latter, the higher the
probability of nonlocal firms being targeted. When this ratio (lagged one year) as well
as its interaction with the nonlocal dummy are added in column (5), the discrimination
effect is only marginally revised while these additional controls themselves statistically
have no effect on the disclosure propensity.18
In column (6) we add firm expenditure on advertisements (in logs) as well as its
interaction with the nonlocal dummy as controls: more advertising activities may expose
a firm to inspections and hence disclosure, a channel which may be more significant
for nonlocal firms. Result confirm the influence of advertising activities, but give no
indication of a differential effect between local and nonlocal firms, while the discrimination
effect remains qualitatively identical. A similar result is obtained in column (7) when we
use the advertising intensity, defined as the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales, to
control for dependence on advertising, and its interaction with the nonlocal indicator.19
In the final column, on top of advertising intensity we further include labor productivity,
defined as sales per employee (in logs), and allow it to vary between local and nonlocal
firms, to control for the possible effect of firm productivity on disclosure. We find among
nonlocal producers that more productive firms are less likely to be disclosed.20
With regard to the debate over increasing (Young, 2000) as opposed to (“[i]f any-
thing”) decreasing (Holz, 2009) internal barriers to trade for China, our regression mod-
els augmented with time-varying “nonlocal” indicators (see Appendix Table A6) suggest
the degree of discrimination remained fairly stable over this relatively short time period.
The sample also allows us to look at the market-specific discrimination effect by includ-
ing market-varying nonlocal dummies (see Appendix Table A7). It appears that Inner
Mongolia is the most discriminatory province among this trio (though only marginally
so compared with Jiangsu) while Zhejiang is the least.21
18Market-year dummies cannot be included in this specification because the ratio measure is defined
at the market-year level.
19The data for advertisement expenditure is missing in ASIE for 2003, so we lose one year’s observations
when these advertising measures are included.
20The estimates in Table 2 are potentially biased since we only use licensed firms when looking at
the discrimination effect. Any potential bias from our setup would arise from differential disclosure
patterns (if any) between licensed and unlicensed firms. Since we do not have information on unlicensed
advertising firms except for those which were disclosed, it is impossible to evaluate the bias directly.
Some informal checks in the Appendix lend support to the sign of our estimates.
21This order of ranking can be compared to that based on company managers’ perception of local
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The above empirical models cannot entirely rule out some biases arising from the
endogeneity of nonlocal disclosure, and the results presented do not completely exclude
alternative interpretations. For instance, local firms may be intrinsically less likely to
be disclosed because of better “local knowledge”: local sellers may have a better under-
standing of how advertisement rules are actually interpreted and implemented at the local
level and thus would ensure that their advertisement practices were within the locally-
defined realms of the acceptable. A further possible explanation is related to strategic
behavior: firms may simply be more aggressive in their advertisements by, for example,
including exaggerated claims about the effectiveness of their drugs when competing in
nonlocal markets. While both arguments appear to have prima facie validity, the am-
biguity of the advertising regulation as well as the stark figures revealed in the media
reports quoted above clearly illustrate that any firm, local or nonlocal, could be disclosed
as having advertised illegally. Further, after exhaustive background searches we fail to
find any evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of drugs — recall that alluding to drug
effectiveness in adverts is illegal — is systematically exaggerated in advertisements for
products by nonlocal firms.
4.2.2 Heterogeneities in Local Protectionism
(A) Inter-Provincial Relationships
As our discussion suggests, politico-economic competition among provinces is likely to be
an institutional source of local protectionism. Specifically, if inter-provincial competition
does exist (in the form of, among other characterizations, Li and Zhou (2005) and Bai
et al. (2014)), we should observe a pattern of discrimination that varies by region of origin
of the advertiser: “illegal” advertising by sellers from economically related provinces
are perhaps more likely to be tolerated. Meanwhile, firms from provinces with a more
substantial base of pharmaceutical industry are perhaps seen as a threat to local producers
and thus more likely to be targeted. As such, we would expect to find a more pronounced
discrimination effect for nonlocal firms which are from provinces with fewer economic ties
to the location and from those provinces with more significant market presence.
The above reasoning, however, ignores the fact that provincial FDAs may well be
protectionism using data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey on China in 2004. The Survey
was conducted at the company level, but we calculated the province-averages of managers’ perception
of the severity of local protectionism which ranges from 0 to 4 with 0 indicating not severe at all and
4 very severe. The scores for the three provinces are: Inner Mongolia 0.59, Jiangsu 0.62, and Zhejiang
0.59. Hence Zhejiang appears to be the least discriminating province in both studies. Also note that
Jiangsu is the largest market and Inner Mongolia is the smallest market among the three provinces,
but because of the rather limited sample this pattern should not be taken as evidence of any definitive
relationship between market size and protectionism. For the same reason, nor should this result be seen
as contradictory to some theories in regulation economics whereby bigger markets tend to set higher
standards and make more rejections when making decisions (e.g. Li, 2001).
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strategic players in a repeated game of symmetric discrimination. A province hostile
towards firms from an economically “strong” region is likely to face future retaliation
from competing local governments. In anticipation of retaliatory discriminative action, a
provincial FDA may proceed in a strategic manner by targeting advertisers from econom-
ically “weaker” provinces. Based on these arguments, the net effects of inter-provincial
relationship on protectionist discrimination are theoretically unclear.
To throw some empirical light on this question we adopt a measure of economic
interdependence between provinces defined as
Province interdependencei,j ≡
flowi,j + flowj,i
outputi + outputj
, (1)
where the interdependence between provinces i and j depends on the ratio of the sum
of bilateral trade flows (flowi,j + flowj,i) to their sum of output (outputi + outputj). A
higher value of this measure implies a higher degree of bilateral dependence between two
provinces. We define a province’s trade flow with itself as output net of shipments to other
provinces and countries following Wei (1996) and Head and Mayer (2000) to account for a
province’s dependence on itself. Using inter-provincial bilateral trade flow data from the
NBS, we find the value of the interdependence measure ranging from 0.02% to 5% (with
an average of 0.7%), and consistently above 50% (with an average of 75%) for a province’s
self-dependence.22 To ease interpretation of the coefficient, we standardize the province
interdependence measure so that it has mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The results are reported in Table 3, where the interaction terms capture the differential
effect of the above inter-provincial relationships between two provinces relative to the
baseline case of producers advertising in their own market.
[Table 3 about here]
According to the estimates in column (1), a one standard deviation increase in the
interdependence measure leads to a 1.3 percentage point drop in the likelihood of dis-
closure: a closer economic relationship between provinces helps reduce discrimination
as provinces tend to be less hostile to producers from “partner” regions. To measure
competitive relations between provinces, we use distance between provincial capital cities
as well as three other variables — the total number of producers, the gross provincial
product, and the total value-added tax (VAT) revenue, all in logs and lagged one year for
the pharmaceutical sector in the firm’s province of origin — to capture the influence of
22The bilateral trade flow data for provinces is only available for 2002, but we believe it is reasonable
to assume the stability of the relative ranking of inter-dependence relations between provinces.
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differential market presence of a province in this sector. Internal distance of a province is
approximated as an average distance between consumers and the center of a disk which
is of the same size of the province (see Head and Mayer, 2000). As shown in column (2),
distance raises the probability of being disclosed. In columns (3)-(5) our alternative mea-
sures of market presence all have significantly negative coefficients, though magnitudes
differ substantially. In columns (6)-(8) we weight the three provincial market presence
variables by the reciprocal of distance between province pairs to allow for geographical
distance to affect inter-provincial competition in tandem with provincial market power.
Coefficients remain negative and statistically significant but are now much more in line
across specifications. The distance-weighted GDP measure, for instance, implies that if
a rival province increases its pharmaceutical output by one percent, its firms will be 3
percent less likely to be disclosed. Considering the average discrimination effect is 8 to 10
percentage points (see Table 2), inter-provincial relationships have a sizable impact and
could easily switch the sign of the net effect. Our findings are thus clear: firms are indeed
treated differently depending on the type of province they come from, with those from a
weaker or less competitive province more likely to be singled out for discrimination.
(B) Political Affiliation
The second level of heterogeneity we investigate is related to the role of political con-
nections: we want to determine to what extent a firm’s affiliation with different levels of
government mitigates or exacerbates the effect of provincial protectionism. It has been
widely acknowledged that social networks play an important part in countries with weak
legal system and contract enforcement (Rauch, 2001). Of all forms of social networks,
political connections are believed to be especially important in regulated industries, such
as pharmaceuticals, since these are administered by government bureaucrats and close
ties with governments may allow firms to exploit regulatory loopholes. This may be par-
ticularly salient for non-state enterprises, for whom government institutions may impose
additional regulatory red tape (Guriev, 2004) or extralegal fees (Johnson et al., 2000).
Measuring political connections in China is challenging since firms are typically un-
willing to reveal this information to outsiders.23 In this study, we resort to firms’ lishu
(literally translated as “subordinate to” or “directly controlled by”) affiliation as a proxy
for their political connections. A lishu relationship indicates a firm’s direct connections
23Fisman and Wang (2013) exploit the data on publicly listed firms, which are required by law to
provide detailed information on senior management, to identify individuals who previously held high-
level government positions. Such information is not available for unlisted firms such as those in our
sample. The study by Li et al. (2008) uses Communist Party membership of private firm owners as
a measure of political ties with the government and the ruling party. However, party membership
information is only collected in bespoke sample surveys created for either of these studies and is not
available in our data.
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with governments at different levels. It is distinct from ownership and entails both gov-
ernment control as well as subsidies and support.24
In our case, both local and nonlocal firms may benefit from such affiliations. On the
one hand, if a firm is “local” to a province then political connections may enable it to
persuade the local FDA to either let them off the hook when in danger of being disclosed
for “illegal” advertising, or to lobby them to single out nonlocal competitors by using a
deliberately broader interpretation of the regulations. On the other hand, nonlocal firms
may benefit from a political affiliation with their own provincial government because of the
environment of inter-provincial competition: being politically connected to a provincial
government (or even the central government) could serve as a shelter from discrimination
in other regions as local governments may fear that targeting firms directly controlled
by other provincial governments would increase the risk of retaliation. The presence and
strength of the above benefits, however, may depend on characteristics of the provinces
involved and in particular on inter-provincial relationships, which we will subject to
empirical validation.
While the data indeed shows variation in political affiliation across firms (see Ap-
pendix Table A8 for sample statistics), we are curious to find out if nonlocal producers
are more likely disclosed if they have (high-level) political connections. We augment the
most comprehensive specification in column (8) of Table 2 by introducing interactions
between affiliation type and being a nonlocal firm. The results are presented in Table 4.
In column (1), we distinguish three levels of affiliation: affiliations to the central, provin-
cial, and lower-level governments. In column (2) we simplify the affiliation dummy by
contrasting provincial government affiliation with all other types. In column (3) we group
provincial and central government affiliation together to contrast with other affiliation
types. Regardless of which of these classification we adopt none of the affiliation types
appear to have a statistically significant differential effect.
[Tables 4 and 5 about here]
24Tan et al. (2007) describe the lishu affiliation system as a uniquely Chinese institutional framework
where the “iron fist” of the planned economy meets the “invisible hand” of the market. Although gov-
ernment interference through lishu declined over time and many private firms in the 2000s opted not to
enter into any formal relations, according to Xia et al. (2009, p. 1655), the Chinese “government never
clearly or formally state[d] that non-public firms are free from lishu”. Based on a small number of em-
pirical studies the economic implications of lishu are somewhat unclear: investigating collectively-owned
enterprises during the early 2000s, Xia et al. (2009) find that abandoning lishu with local government
enhanced firm performance; Tan et al. (2007), in a study of firms of all ownership types in the late
1990s, report a nonlinear relationship whereby firm productivity declines from top (central) to lower
(prefecture-level) lishu affiliation but then dramatically increases for the bottom (township) category;
Guariglia and Mateut (forthcoming) find that over the 2000-2007 period higher level lishu affiliation is
associated with better access to credit, to the extent that political affiliation can wipe out the historical
advantage of state-owned over private firms.
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Since these results may be distorted by the interaction of political connections with
inter-provincial relationships, we create a full set of interaction terms for affiliation type,
inter-provincial relationships and the nonlocal dummy. The estimates for these triple
interaction terms are displayed in Table 5. In columns (1)-(5), we only distinguish two
affiliation types — affiliation to provincial governments and others. The statistically
significant triple interaction terms suggest that the effects of inter-provincial relationship
are more pronounced for firms with provincial-level than those with lower affiliations.
These estimates are robust to an alternative classification of affiliation in columns (6)-
(10), where provincial and central government affiliations are again contrasted with other
affiliation types. The overall indication of this exercise is that while being away from
home exposes a firm to discrimination in other regions, this risk could be offset by good
inter-provincial relations and by the home province’s market power.
(C) Tax Revenue Incentive
Another expectation from the earlier discussion is that in provinces with a more sub-
stantial share of tax revenue from local drug producers, local governments are more
incentivized to protect their local entrepreneurs. We adopt the share of pharmaceutical
in manufacturing output (in value terms) as a proxy for a province’s fiscal incentive to
engage in protection to analyze this channel. A higher value of this share implies a more
prominent local pharmaceutical industry, hence a stronger fiscal incentive to safeguard
tax revenue. If our hypothesis is correct, we should observe a positive association be-
tween this fiscal incentive measure and the propensity of nonlocal firms being disclosed
in advertising inspections. We implement this empirical test using an interaction term
between the nonlocal dummy and the measure of pharmaceutical share in total man-
ufacturing output. A problem with the three-province sample for this test is the lack
of cross-province variation for our fiscal incentive measure. We therefore return to the
full sample of 31 provinces, but at the price of having to rely on the strong assumption
that every firm advertises in all provinces. We should expect a downward biased, likely
insignificant, average discrimination effect because of the vastly overstated number of
nonlocal firms engaging in advertising. However, since we are not aware of any com-
pelling evidence for whether and how this bias is correlated with province fiscal incentive,
it is worth checking the differential effect. The results are contained in Table 6.
[Table 6 about here]
In the baseline model in column (1), the discrimination effect is significantly positive
but as expected economically very small. The coefficients on pharmaceutical share in
GDP and on the interaction term suggest that a larger local pharmaceutical industry
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leads to a higher propensity for the local FDA to (i) disclose any advertisers, and (ii)
to disproportionately disclose nonlocal advertisers. The “tax revenue incentive” effect is
estimated to be 10-15%. Given that the pharmaceutical share measure ranges from 0 to
1, the estimated effect implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the pharmaceutical
share leads to a 1-1.5 percentage point increase in the disclosure propensity, which is a
sizable impact given that the average effect is underestimated in these models. Overall,
these results provide evidence for a “tax revenue motive” underlying local protectionism.25
5 Concluding Remarks
This study offers direct micro-level evidence for the existence and patterns of provin-
cial protectionism in China. We show that drug advertising regulations and inspections
are used as a protectionist tool by provincial administrations to shelter local firms from
extra-provincial competition. In addition, the actual pattern of protectionism is rather
heterogeneous: while firms from “weaker” provinces in terms of pharmaceutical indus-
try prowess are preferred targets, firms from economic “partner” provinces experience
comparatively less discrimination. These findings are consistent with the observations
and theories on the politico-economic competition among regions in China, and the over-
all picture we depict accords closely with the recent characterization of China’s growth
model as “crony capitalism” with fierce inter-regional competition (Bai et al., 2014).
Our findings point to some specific areas where efforts could be made to reduce inter-
nal trade barriers in China. First, tighter screening of the local application of national
regulations may be useful to reduce the scope for rent-seeking behavior on behalf of local
authorities. Second, political ties between local regulatory authorities and local govern-
ments should be reduced or cut to counteract the resulting incentives for discriminatory
behavior in the narrow interest of local governments and producers. Third, while polit-
25A caveat regarding the results based on the full 31 province sample is that the strong assumption
of every firm advertising in every provinces leads to bias in the key parameters of interest. This issue
is difficult to tackle satisfactorily given the data at our disposal. However, a “permutation exercise”
may be helpful to check whether the assumption itself could be driving some of the key relations we
find in the data. Specifically, by repeatedly drawing a subset of provinces from the full 31 province
sample, we artificially expand the variation of province characteristics, which then allows us to investigate
whether those characteristics identified as crucial in our analysis are sensitive to the particular sample
of provinces selected. While we know that the disclosure propensity for nonlocal firms is significantly
downward biased because of the assumption that all firms advertise in all provinces, our test of the “tax
revenue incentive” hypothesis in these permutations would be biased only if the underestimated disclosure
propensity were to differ systematically with different levels of pharmaceutical-to-total manufacturing
output across provinces. The results of our permutation exercise indicate that a 10% increase in the
share of pharmaceuticals in manufacturing output is associated with a 0.4% increase in the estimated
discrimination effect, thus broadly supporting the finding of the fiscal incentive motive. More details on
this exercise are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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ical affiliations with regional governments may be beneficial to a firm’s business in the
local market, it may be detrimental to its sales in other regions. This calls for a further
de-politicization of the economy — the withdrawal of governmental power from the realm
of the market, a pressing task in the gradual economic reform in China.
Our study suffers from several data limitations. First, we are unable to identify
licensed firms except in a small subset of provinces, which limits our ability to link
the protectionism pattern to the characteristics of the implementing provinces. Second,
since firm sales data are not available by province, we cannot quantify the effect of
discrimination on firm performance in each market. We believe, however, the makeup of
our three-province sample, including advanced and backward provinces, suggests some
representativeness for the country at large.
This research has a potential for some follow-up work to assess the welfare impact of
local protectionism. While a growing literature shows that excessive regulations cause
sizable welfare losses in developed economies (see e.g. Jones et al. (2009) for the US),
a possible extension of this study is to evaluate the net welfare effect of the provincial
competition in China.
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Tables
Table 1. Numbers of Firms by Disclosure Type — 31 Provinces
Disclosed firms
Year
Undisclosed
firms
only in
home province
only in
other provinces
in both home and
other provinces Total
2001 3,349 0 135 2 3,486
2002 3,364 23 283 10 3,680
2003 3,900 3 145 14 4,062
2004 4,535 4 145 25 4,709
2005 4,699 7 227 36 4,969
Total 7,770 35 606 68 7,883
Note. We report the number of firms in all rows. Repeated disclosure for illegal advertising accounts for
the discrepancy between the totals and column sums for disclosed firms, the unbalanced nature of the
panel for the same discrepancy in the undisclosed firms.
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Table 4. Role of Political Affiliation — Three-Province Sample
LHS: indicator of a firm being disclosed
(1) (2) (3)
Nonlocal 0.206*** 0.219*** 0.220***
(0.075) (0.070) (0.071)
Lower-level affiliation 0.015
(0.014)
Provincial affiliation 0.013 -0.004
(0.036) (0.032)
Central affiliation 0.039
(0.049)
Nonlocal×Lower-level affiliation 0.015
(0.033)
Nonlocal×Provincial affiliation 0.070 0.056
(0.055) (0.047)
Nonlocal×Central affiliation 0.103
(0.106)
(Provincial + central) affiliation 0.004
(0.033)
Nonlocal×(Provincial + central) affiliation 0.059
(0.043)
Other controls not displayed:
sales (lagged), previously disclosed, ad intensity, nonlocal×ad intensity,
labor productivity, nonlocal×labor productivity, ownership dummies, market-year dummies
# Firms 523 523 523
# Observations 1,644 1,644 1,644
Adj. R2 0.147 0.146 0.148
Note. This table reports regression results of the linear probability models on the interacted
effect of political affiliation and inter-provincial relations on the propensity of disclosure in
“illegal” drug advertising inspections for the sample of firms which held advertising licenses in
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and/or Inner Mongolia. The dependent variable takes on the value of one
if a firm is disclosed in the province during the calendar year and zero otherwise. “Provincial
affiliation” is a dummy which takes on the value of one for provincial government affiliation
and zero otherwise. “Central affiliation” is a dummy which takes on the value of one for central
government affiliation and zero otherwise. “Lower affiliation” is a dummy which takes on the
value of one for below-province level government affiliation and zero otherwise. “(Provincial
+ central) affiliation” is a dummy which takes on the value of one for provincial or central
government affiliation and zero otherwise. Definitions of all other variables are the same as in
the previous tables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm-level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 6. Tax Revenue Incentive and Discriminative Disclosure — 31-Province Sample
LHS: indicator of a firm being disclosed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonlocal 0.002** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Share of pharma GDP 0.088*** 0.093** 0.095** 0.090**
(0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Nonlocal*(Share of pharma GDP) 0.109** 0.139** 0.140** 0.145**
(0.044) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
Ad expenditure No No Yes No No
Nonlocal×Ad expenditure No No Yes No No
Ad intensity No No No Yes Yes
Nonlocall×Ad intensity No No No Yes Yes
Labor productivity No No No No Yes
Nonlocall×Labor productivity No No No No Yes
Sales (lagged) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previously disclosed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Firms 5,531 5,531 5,353 5,311 5,310
# Observations 388,306 388,306 298,313 296,391 296,329
Adj. R2 0.066 0.068 0.074 0.074 0.074
Note. This table reports regression results of the linear probability models on the determinants of
disclosure in “illegal” drug advertising inspections for the sample of all firms in 31 provinces under the
assumption that every firm advertises in all provinces. The dependent variable takes on the value of one
if a firm is disclosed in the province during the calendar year and zero otherwise. Definitions of the other
variables are the same as in the previous tables, except the introduction of the interactions between year
dummies (with 2001 as the omitted base) and the nonlocal dummy. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the firm-level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Fig. 1. The Relationships between FDAs and Governments in China, 2000-2008.
This chart shows the relations between FDAs of different levels as well their relations with
governments of different levels. This structure was in place between 2000 and 2008 and
indicates the channels through which provincial governments could exert influence over local
FDAs at both the provincial and lower levels.
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Fig. 2. Numbers of Drug Producers by Province. This map plots the number of drug
firms (defined as those whose primary industry of operation is reported as the pharmaceutical
industry in the ASIE database) by province in 2003.
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Appendix – not intended for publication
Two Examples of Public Disclosure
In 2007 “Fei Xiao Tong Chang” cough syrup was disclosed for exaggerated advertise-
ments in the city of Suzhou. The Bureau for Industry and Commerce in Suzhou forced
its manufacturer to stop the advertisement immediately as well as to pay a fine of 7,500
yuan (at the time around US$1,000); see http://www.bsqgsj.gov.cn/baweb/show/
shiju/bawebFile/3411.html. In a more serious case in 2013, an advertiser in Zhe-
jiang Province was fined 122,679 yuan (at the time around US$20,000) for “misleading
content in advertisement” of its drug to treat arthritis-related diseases; see http://news.
xinhuanet.com/health/2013-04/25/c_124630444.htm. It should be noted that fines
for illegal advertisement in China never appear to have been set under a nationwide
standard and that in practice different local FDAs and related authorities enjoy a great
degree of discretion when it comes to specific cases; see, for instance, the recent rules
set by Sichuan Province, http://opinion.chengdu.cn/topic/2014-10/14/content_
1563916.htm?node=12023.
Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1. Numbers of Firms — 31-Province Sample
Year ASIE ADVERTS
Matched
ASIE-ADVERTS
2001 3,486 175 137
2002 3,680 449 316
2003 4,062 221 162
2004 4,709 214 174
2005 4,969 328 270
Total 7,883 796 653
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Table A2. Numbers of Local and Nonlocal Firms Disclosed for “Illegal” Advertising
— 31-Province Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Province Local
Non-
local All
% local
firms in
disclosed
% province’s
firms in
country
% province’s
employment
in country
Difference
(2)-(3)
Ningxia 0 28 28 0.00 0.20 0.28 -0.20
Qinghai 2 46 48 4.17 0.33 0.29 3.84
Tibet 0 5 5 0.00 0.34 0.13 -0.34
Xinjiang 0 83 83 0.00 0.50 0.26 -0.50
Hainan 1 97 98 1.02 1.07 0.51 -0.05
Gansu 4 97 101 3.96 1.10 1.03 2.86
Inner Mongolia† 1 128 129 0.78 1.10 1.15 -0.33
Chongqing 1 86 87 1.15 1.25 1.91 -0.10
Fujian 2 105 107 1.87 1.76 1.55 0.11
Yunnan 4 78 82 4.88 1.86 1.39 3.02
Shanxi 7 79 86 8.14 2.10 2.14 6.04
Heilongjiang 5 140 145 3.45 2.11 3.85 1.34
Guizhou 3 103 106 2.83 2.40 1.66 0.43
Tianjin 5 67 72 6.94 2.46 3.36 4.48
Anhui 0 135 135 0.00 2.63 2.38 -2.63
Guangxi 0 93 93 0.00 2.96 2.59 -2.96
Jiangxi 1 124 125 0.80 2.99 3.48 -2.19
Hunan 2 109 111 1.80 3.33 2.29 -1.53
Liaoning 8 104 112 7.14 3.58 3.09 3.56
Shaanxi 7 74 81 8.64 3.61 3.09 5.03
Beijing 1 64 65 1.54 3.85 3.08 -2.31
Hebei 0 103 103 0.00 3.88 6.43 -3.88
Jilin 13 85 98 13.27 4.56 3.83 8.71
Shanghai 4 60 64 6.25 4.67 4.50 1.58
Sichuan 4 142 146 2.74 4.95 4.80 -2.21
Hubei 7 135 142 4.93 5.15 5.39 -0.22
Henan 2 66 68 2.94 5.24 6.26 -2.30
Guangdong 5 90 95 5.26 6.60 6.13 -1.34
Shandong 8 187 195 4.10 6.98 8.52 -2.88
Zhejiang† 0 134 134 0.00 8.07 6.87 -8.07
Jiangsu† 6 173 179 3.35 8.36 7.75 -5.00
Note. Provinces are ordered by their proportions of pharmaceutical firms in the country. †Provinces
contained in our regression sample.
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Table A3. Numbers of Licensed and Unlicensed Firms Disclosed — Three-Province Sample
Jiangsu disclosed Jiangsu undisclosed
Licensed Unlicensed Licensed
Year Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local
2001 0 0 6 0 68 65
2002 9 0 28 0 66 71
2003 9 2 24 0 79 75
2004 26 5 58 0 81 99
2005 15 2 66 1 85 102
Total 59 9 182 1 379 412
Zhejiang disclosed Zhejiang undisclosed
Licensed Unlicensed Licensed
Year Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local
2001 1 0 7 0 169 40
2002 13 0 16 0 178 40
2003 16 0 10 0 208 41
2004 19 0 14 0 220 47
2005 31 0 40 0 213 44
Total 80 0 87 0 988 212
Inner Mongolia disclosed Inner Mongolia undisclosed
Licensed Unlicensed Licensed
Year Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local
2001 3 0 14 0 91 14
2002 6 0 15 0 105 14
2003 23 0 18 0 110 18
2004 34 1 18 0 135 23
2005 38 0 12 0 127 25
Total 104 1 77 0 568 94
Three provinces disclosed Three provinces undisclosed
Licensed Unlicensed Licensed
Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local Nonlocal Local
Total 243 10 346 1 1,935 718
Note. The sample here is made up of all 569 licensed firms in the three provinces, comprising 2,906
observations.
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Table A8. Numbers of Firms by Location and Affiliation Type —
Three-Province Sample
Government affiliation
Location None Lower Province Central Total
Baseline sample:
Local 101 523 28 10 662
Nonlocal 250 1,495 449 50 2,244
Total 351 2,018 477 60 2,906
Reduced sample:
Local 59 401 22 8 490
Nonlocal 162 1,110 338 40 1,650
Total 221 1,511 360 48 2,140
Note. This table reports the number of firms in all rows. “Baseline sample” indicates
the statistics for the models where lagged values are not included, while “Reduced
sample” indicates the statistics for the models estimated where lagged values are
included.
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Investigating the bias from selective disclosure between licensed and unli-
censed firms
As a first indication, it can be seen from Table A3 that virtually all (346/347=99.7%)
of the disclosed firms who got caught for unlicensed advertising were from outside the
region. Given the fact that in reality some local firms may also engage in unlicensed
advertising, this figure shows an extremely strong bias against nonlocal advertisers when
local FDAs deal with unlicensed advertising activities. As a result, even if unlicensed
advertising firms were included in our analysis, the discrimination effect would probably
only be stronger than it is currently estimated.
Second, we run placebo tests on expanded samples where all pharmaceutical produc-
ers in 31 provinces are included. In panel A of Table A9, we apply the same specifications
as in Table 2 on an enlarged sample of firm-province-year combinations by assuming that
each firm advertises in the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Inner Mongolia. As
expected, the discrimination effect is now much lower (0.5%-0.74%) but is positive and
statistically significant in most specifications. In Panel B, using the same set of explana-
tory variables we resort to the bivariate probit model with the dependent variable in
the additional equation (unreported) being a dummy for whether the firm was granted a
license in one of the three provinces in a given year. The assumption is that every firm
applies for licenses and advertises in the three provinces and the determination mecha-
nism for licensing is the same as that for disclosure. The estimated marginal effect of
being a nonlocal firm indicates a significantly positive discrimination effect, larger than
our results Panel A but smaller than the baseline estimates in Table 2 of the main paper.
In panel C, the sample is further expanded with an even more radical assumption that
each firm advertises in all 31 provinces of the country. Not surprisingly, the estimated
discrimination effect is further reduced to below 6% but remains significantly different
from zero in most specifications. Since all three assumptions exaggerate the actual num-
ber of firms who advertise or apply for licenses in the data, the estimates could be easily
driven downward to zero or even negative values. Nevertheless in fact the estimates are
still mostly positive and significant (albeit of smaller sizes), which we then take as further
supporting evidence for the existence of a discrimination effect.
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